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resumo: Parece que estamos sempre à 
espera de ecrãs. Mas de que estamos realmente 
à espera? Encarando o ecrã como um objecto 
de preocupação escultural, este artigo tenta 
compreender o quão inerente as relações-
evento podem escapar ao dualismo digital/
analógico do ecrã. Partindo das construções 
de Graham Harman things-in-themselves e as 
noções de Tristão Garcia sobre a compacidade 
e intensidade, o ‘nonsense’ da imagem indexical 
é explorada através de discussão de recentes 
projectos de escultura do autor que desafiam a 
correlação de pressupostos acerca da presença 
e da necessidade de esperar por ele (Harman, 
2011; Garcia, 2014).
palavras-chave: ecrã; digital; realismo espe-
culativo, escultura; imagem; presença.
abstract: It seems that we are always waiting 
for screens. But what are we really waiting for? 
Treating the screen as an object of sculptural 
concern, this paper attempts to understand 
how inherent event-relationships might escape 
digital/analogue dualisms of the screen. Drawing 
on Graham Harman’s constructs of things-
in-themselves and Tristan Garcia’s notions of 
compactness and intensity, the ‘nonsense’ of the 
indexical image is explored through discussion 
of the author’s recent sculptural projects that 
challenge correlational assumptions about 
presence and the necessity of waiting for it 
(Harman, 2011; Garcia, 2014).
Keywords: screen; digital; speculative real-
ism, sculpture; image; presence.
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I find them rather calming really — the slow expectant cycle of the throbber — 
the animated gif, loading icon, its never-quite-closed circle holding my gaze like a 
thwarted Ouroboros1 that can never quite grasp what it’s looking at. It is a gaze that 
goes beyond the screen to an event not yet here — the arrival of content yet to come.
These tiny byte-size files — simple sequences of images played one af-
ter another in an endless loop — are the image of wasted time, of time spent 
unproductively, somehow suspended between past and future events. Inserted 
between that which has happened and that which is yet to happen, each image 
is itself a discrete image marking its own time –waiting for the next image in the 
sequence to arrive. Waiting for the moment when the download is complete 
and the present is realised.
It is this space of becoming — the event space between images — that I 
want to explore in this paper. It is this space that I might term the space of prac-
tice, which is situated between images, between objects, for it is here in the act 
of becoming that the opposition between pre and post, between the dichotomy 
of digital and the analogue can be understood.
Talking through my recent practice I will try to understand how we wait, 
watch and live with screens as objects in order to approach a notion of a logue 
that is both discrete and continuous.  Although as a sculptor I lay no claims to the 
screen image, the screen is clearly an object available in the world like any other 
object and as such is of sculptural concern.  To this extent the terms image and 
object might be interchangeable, but more crucially the screen is an object in a 
flat ontology of things. As defined by Graham Harman, things are a construct of 
real objects and sensual objects/images (Harman, 2011, p.60).  To this end I will 
draw on Speculative Realist (SR) constructs of both the object and time as it re-
lates to my own research practice that seeks to wait somewhere in the becoming 
between the digital and the analogue — between the screen and events.
It is in this waiting space that I seek to locate my practice, not as a prac-
tice of crisis or hesitation but as a state of potential. To explain this I first need 
1 Symbol depicting a serpent eating its own tail.
JAMES CHARLTON
Fig. 1 — Throbber.
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to stipulate a reading of the digital and analogue within the context of my re-
search. The digital, although culturally embedded in the computation architec-
tures, is not, I argue, tethered to technology, but is a type of structural method 
within the framework of materiality. 
Structural methods I propose are, like Jane Bennett’s vital-matter-assem-
blages –emergent properties that are distinct from individual agents (Bennett, 
2010). In a state of becoming, structural methods emphasise the dynamic means 
through which things emerge. Drawing on Lewis2 and Florridi, a digital struc-
tural method might be seen as a method of becoming that promotes discrete 
non-corporeal structures, regardless of the ontological affiliation of its consti-
tuted parts (Lewis, 1971; Florridi, 2009). Conversely, the analogue is a method of 
becoming that supports non-corporeal continuities of structure.
The space in which I refer to the work as waiting, in a state of potential, 
is not so much the potential of Deleuze’s virtual as it is Aden Evens’ fold (Evens, 
2010). The fold for Evens, like Cascone’s glitch, is like a failure in the surface of the 
digital that makes it available to the analogue (Cascone, 2000).3 But as we will see, 
it is not necessary to hermetically frame the analogue and the digital in an oppo-
sitional framework in this way if we allow for an agency of the event: if we wait.
WHo Is practIce WaItIng For?
Waiting Practice 32 exists as a still image from a public action that took place in 
Berlin in August, 2014. The artist, carrying thirty-two tennis balls, walked diago-
nally across an intersection. Upon reaching the centre, without breaking stride, 
the thirty-two balls were dropped and the artist walked on. 
As an action rather than a performance this work draws us to its singular-
ity — to the simplicity of the act that can be summed up in a short sentence or 
articulated in a singe image. It is a singularity that in one sense keeps us waiting 
— waiting for a resolve that will never come, as the image itself is not waiting, 
not wanting. It is complete. Yet at the same time the image demands that we 
consider the work as more than a point out of context in time. We cannot, in-
deed we are asked not to, forget that the image exists in time — the time of the 
image before and the image after. 
Like the thirty-two balls spraying out across the cobbled street, the image 
itself is shadowed by a trail of Bergsonian moments that blur the duration of the 
action into an event of duration.  As the inner autonomy of each ball dissolves 
like a Bergson ‘sugar cube’4 in the autonomy of the experience that is this image 
2 
3 
4 
Lewis defines the digital as a discrete representation in opposition to the analogue, which is seen as a 
continuous representation (Lewis, 1971).  
Evens' fold is ‘the mechanism by which the digital connects to the human and the actual’ (Evens, 2010, 
p.32). See also Bergson, Creative Evolution and Deleuze, Bergson — 1859-194V (Bergson, 2014, 
pp.32-33; De-
POST SCREEN NOT DiSPLAyED
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Fig. 2 — Charlton, Waiting Practice 32, 2014. 
Fig. 3 — Charlton, 32-Bit Catch, 2013.
JAMES CHARLTON
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as a whole, they become qualitative multiplicities without number (Bergson, 
1960, p.226-232).5
Yet in contrast to the ‘purely qualitative world of Bergsonian 
duration’ (Garcia, 2014, p.173), the image here is indexically insistent that we 
must con-sider this work from more positions than the image alone allows. 
The status of the photograph, as stated by Lefebvre, is never indexically 
disqualified. Images exist, like all things, anchored in the world of semiotic 
function that indicates what it is ‘about to stand for’ (Lefebvre, 2007,  p.224).
Waiting Practice 32 problematizes not simply the relationship between 
event and documentation that is now so clearly evident in the work of 60/70 
performance artists as presented by Rodenbeck in her analysis of Allan Kaprow’s 
Happenings, but also in regard to the event itself (Rodenbeck, 2011,  pp. 221-228).
Unable to unshackle themselves from abstract expressionism indexical 
register, Happenings and Performance events can only ever be experienced as 
‘thoroughly mediated’ (Jones, 1998, p.85). Despite Kaprow’s attempts to 
untan-gle his work from documentation by instructional strategies,  
documentation remains a ‘means of showing what experience is like’ (Jeff 
Wall 1995 as in Ro-denbeck).  Images in this sense ‘provide(s) an experience of 
an experience’ that estrange both the live event and the event of the image 
from the present. The event according to Jones is no less an indexical 
moment than an image. Both make it equally ‘clear that there is no original 
event’ (Jones, 2011).  It is not surprising then that a single frame of the throbber removed from 
its animation sequence still seems to move before our eyes.  Forever indexical, 
embedded in the throbbing sequence of our memory, each image is as present 
as the event ever was.
Waiting Practice 32 is then not waiting for anything and least of all for the 
practice of an artist who is impossibly present (Jones, 2011).  It is non-anthro-
pocentrically complete in itself through the indexical function that has arrested 
it as a discrete image. Yet, as problematised by Jones, waiting exists in a state 
of tension between presence and present, in a state of ‘now that can never be 
grasped’ (Jones, 2011).
graspIng screens 
This tension is central to the absence that we see in 32-Bit Catch — a video work 
in which a ball is thrown against a wall and caught again thirty-two times. The 
video starts with a blank wall defined by the optically distorted corner towards 
leuze, 2004, pp.22-23).
5 While Bergson and Deleuze might contribute much to this discussion regarding the nature of the event, 
my aim here to explore how SR constructs of time contribute to our understanding of screens and events. 
As a result Bergson and Deleuze are only lightly touched on in this text.
POST SCREEN NOT DiSPLAyED
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the left of the screen.  Only when an arm enters the frame on the right of the 
screen are we aware that the video is in slow motion. Gradually the hand holding 
the ball primes itself to throw. In the moment preceding the release of the ball 
the video cuts — we hear a dull thud and the ball is suddenly hitting the wall on 
the left and bouncing back. No sooner has the ball bounced back than the 
video cuts again, and suddenly the ball is back in the disembodied hand. Each 
thirty-two frame segment is repeated thirty-two times, punctuated by the 
sound of the ball hitting the wall.
Here the screen event of the ball’s movement through space is never 
made available to us. We can never quite grasp the screen image in total. It is 
withheld from us by the thing that is the video. It is as if the ball cannot 
wait for us. Instead we are shown what amount to still images — blocs of film 
that seem to operate as ‘‘mobile section(s) of duration’ that change the 
duration of the whole (Deleuze, 1986, p.8). 
While we understand the act of the hand throwing and the ball bouncing, 
we also construct a new duration of the whole from these actions. In fact, when 
the hand finally stops throwing the ball and disappears from the screen we are 
surprised — for there is no apparent reason why this cycle should be interrupt-
ed. The bounce and the throw might endlessly reciprocate each other — 
each projecting the trajectory of the ball back to the action of the other. 
In the continuity of this montage each action becomes its own past and 
future as it coexists in the moment of the image.  As a bidirectional projection of 
itself, the catch/bounce movement-image has become a thing-in-itself “insepa-
rable from the before and after which belong to it” (Deleuze, 1989, p.38).
WaItIng For lIVeness
But the thing-in-itself constructed in the montage is not to be understood as an 
assembly of parts. Rather, as Graham Harman extending Heidigger explains, 
a thing-in-itself is an irreducible agent within non-anthropocentric schemas 
of things. As a thing-in-itself is for Harman an object that is always withdrawn 
from the world, things, due to time and space being internalised, need not be 
continuous. Just as Jones problematises the state of something being inside 
something else as a discourse of authenticity and presence (Jones, 2011, p.39), 
Harman proposes a thing that is withdrawn yet available only through its real 
qualities. (Harman, 2013, p.176). 6 In this sense it seems that the thing-in-itself is 
problematized as being a nonsense that is both a continuity of discreteness and 
a discrete continuity. 
6 Harman redefines time and space as generated in the tensions between objects and qualities within his 
quadruple object framework (Harman, 2011, p.29).
JAMES CHARLTON
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Following Harman’s thing-in-itself, the live screen is an always 
elsewhere7 distribution of discrete events spread across a multiplicity of sites, 
that create unlimited events-in-themselves on a plethora of computer screens, 
televisions, LED/LCD displays in public and private spaces. This elsewehereness 
then, rather than being the result of On-demand streaming, Live+ and Timeshift 
broadcasting, is embed-ded in the viability of liveness itself that problematises the 
notion of the live screen. 
Live screens whose synchronicity with an event-subject supposedly en-
dow them with liveness are live only by virtue of being re-enactments — images 
that are things-in-themselves without need of an original act. ‘There is no singu-
lar, authentic original act we can refer to in order to confirm the true meaning of 
an event’ (Jones, 2011, p.42).  Always indexically tethered to a live-event8 through 
the dependency of re-enactment, live-screens are insistently their own event.
Yet as a thing-in itself the live-screen event must also be withdrawn from 
the world. Within the construct of Harman’s Quadruple Object the live-screen is 
never live; it must always be waiting for something. Waiting for something to re-
alise its sensual qualities that ‘exist(s) only insofar as some perceiver is occupied 
with them.’ (Harman, 2011, p.60)9
Even the temporal displacement of Live + and Timeshift-broadcasting 
does not mean the screen waits for us. Time-shifting a screen or an object does 
not make it any more or less available as a thing-in-itself.  The presence of an 
event is never present (Jones, 2011, p.19).   The problem then with the func-
tion of real-time broadcast is not whether it is synchronous or not but that it 
exposes the unavailability of itself as an event that is never live, never available 
regardless of when or where it is watched. To this extent the live screen is a re-
enactment in which ‘the past activates the now as already over’ and ‘the present 
(is) already turning into the future — and both continually escape human knowl-
edge’ (Jones, 2011, p.43).
WatcHIng obJects
The live screen then is caught up in the same tautology as other images — other 
things that in their being never become — spiralling endlessly away from us. Yet 
not only are we spending more time watching screens, we are watching more 
screens in the same place at the same time — we are doing more in less time (The 
Cross-Platform Series, 2014, p.3). We are waiting less.  The screen event is no 
longer an isolated image framed by a techno-object, it is a device-independent 
7 
8 
9 
The notion of the image as a product of “elsewhere” is outside of the scope of this paper but is discussed 
in Reconciling interiors: The screen as installation, (Charlton, 2003).
That I have already claimed via Jones is not present to anything other than itself anyway.
Levi Bryant’s rejection of Deleuze’s virtual pure past supports this position due to its co-
existence  (Bryant, 2009). 
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Fig. 4— Charlton, iForm, 2010.
Fig. 5 — Charlton. Three Actions in 56 Bytes with Aleks Slota. 2014.
JAMES CHARLTON
178
PO
ST
SC
R
EE
N
: D
ev
ic
e,
 M
ed
iu
m
 &
 C
on
ce
pt
event that is instantiated on multiple objects, — the smart phones, tablets and 
laptops that are the second screen users engage with while watching TV.
The screen object then becomes a spatially distributed event that con-
firms not the object nature of the screen but that the screen event is a construct 
of our making it present — even if, as shown, the present is already past.
So when Robert Myres claims that he is ‘watching Raiders of the Lost 
Ark on a baguette (Myres, 2012), he is not literally arguing that the screen is 
a baguette but that by implication everything becomes a screen. Although on 
the grounds of irreducibility I would contest the ability of the screen to operate 
by proxy, the proposition confirms the object as an indexical image as asserted 
earlier by Lefebvre. Following this argument, however, we might frame iForm, 
2011, as a screen — as an object that is indexically located by our watching of it.
Mirroring Kaprow’s instructional strategies, iForm is the image produced 
by a set of instructions in which participants with iPhones were dropped off 
in different locations around a circular bus route. At a designated time they 
opened a GPS App and started feeding geo-spatial data to a server where soft-
ware watching the GPS data generated a real-time 3D model, which was subse-
quently realised as a 3D print.
Like the balls in Waiting 32, the participants in iForm are made present 
in the object as qualitative multiplicities, each GPS coordinate shadowing 
the former in an animated sequence of discontinuous moments that define 
the whole and yet are lost to themselves.  The meta-event that is the 3D 
object — the indexical image — assimilates the participants’ discrete digital 
being within its own whole — a whole that is an event of events of 
increasing resolution.  However, to accept this reading of iForm would be to 
accept an ‘it from bit’ on-tology in which everything is derived from binary 
choices, in which everything is fundamentally digital in nature (Wheeler, 1990, 
p.310). To do this would once again position the image10 itself as an 
impossible presence, as a thing-in-itself that in its presence declares it lack of 
availability.  The problem then remains — how are things removed from a 
perpetual state of waiting to be made present in the world?
MoVIng on — not WaItIng For tHIngs
What I have tried to frame in this discussion of indexical practice, waiting im-
ages and watched screens, is a dilemma of presence — presence that requires 
things to be both available and yet withdrawn in a manner that I argue is similar 
in structural nature to the digital and analogue duality. Yet so far I have been un-
able to resolve the duplicitous nature of presence. 
10 I have already established the image as a indexical function and thus image is used here to refer to art-
work — Waiting 32, iForm. 
POST SCREEN NOT DiSPLAyED
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Fig. 6 — Charlton. Three Actions in 56 Bytes, 2014.
JAMES CHARLTON
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Surprisingly enough it was the act of removing objects, of making them 
indirectly available by withdrawing them from an exhibition space, that recently 
clarified this for me. Faced with some challenging gallery constraints, I resolved 
to relocate the bulk of an installation to a parallel site. The bike-pumps, inner-
tubes, tennis-balls and audio-modules that make up Three Actions in 56 Bytes 
were thus installed in a different venue a few blocks away from the gallery itself. 
In the gallery I left only a blue scrolling LED sign that stated over and over again 
— This work has moved 52°31’47.5’N 13°23’16.7’E 38.30m.11 
As a meta-structure for the work, the act of withdrawal played out strate-
gies within the work itself — strategies regarding the availability of live actions, 
and the discreteness of objects that I have discussed as problematic in regard to 
the notion of screens and objects. In splitting the work across two sites, the 
work as a whole — as a continuity of discrete elements and a duplicity of 
presence and absence,  is somehow resolved. Like the tennis ball being thrown 
against the wall in 32-Bit Catch, the cohesion of the work resides in the 
separateness of ele-ments that are not wanting in themselves.  Rather than 
being forced to accept the polemic of digital and analogue — of waiting and 
becoming — presence and absence are necessary parts of the same thing. 
This is the point Tristan Garcia makes in distinguishing between 
‘that which is something, and that which something is’ (Garcia, 2014, p.52). 
Drawing on McTaggart’s series construct of time which holds that the 
‘distinctions of present, past and future cannot be true’ (McTaggart, 1908, 
p.464), Garcia offers us a third option for resolving the co-conditional 
construct of things as things-in-something, when he proposes a continuous 
model of time in which past and future are intense variations of presence 
rather than isolated positions.12 The future, rather than being discreet and 
separate from the present, is part of the continuity of event time in which the 
discrete thing is something (Garcia, 2014, pp.177-187). Following this, then, a 
screen is something, but the image that the screen is, is not the same as the 
screen-event or the original act. All exist in their not being of the other, a 
process through which they maintain their compact-ness13 by being in relation 
to each other. Massumi clarifies this point when, drawing on Whithead and James, he 
declares that ‘event itself is a subjective self-creation’ (Massumi, 2011, p.8)14. 
Massumi does not pre-suppose a subject; rather the subject begins in the 
event of the indexical image itself that Massumi defines as the inclusion of a 
thing in relation to another thing (Massumi, 2011, p.6). Massumi’s term for this 
11 GPS coordinates of the parallel site.
12 While it is useful here to remember Bergson’s treatment of duration and memory, as later developed 
Bergson’s dualisms are seen as problematic (Bergson, 1988, p.71).
13 Unpacking the ontology of things, Tristan Garcia proposes that failure is in fact a condition of the com-
pactness of an object being itself (Garcia, 2014, p.64).
14 Massumi’s activist philosophy draws heavily on Whithead’s process philosophy and James’ radical em-
piricism. (Massumi, 2002, p.230 -239; Massumi, 2011, p.14-15).
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is semblance — the manner in which the event-potential appears, ‘reflecting 
itself directly and immediately in lived abstraction’ (Masumi, 2011. p.19)15. In the 
self-realisation of Massumi’s semblance and radical availability, Garcia’s com-
pact thing, the problem of causality, seems resolved in a way that evades the 
workaround of Harman’s quadruple-object schema in which the indexical image 
seems to wait in perpetuity for something to realise it.The proposition presented by Garcia’s intense compact ontology 
and Massumi’s self-realising semblance is that the dualisms of intuition16, the 
oppo-sitions of matter and duration, quantity and quality, science and 
metaphysics, analogue and digital, reduce the world to sets of paired 
tendencies that are sim-ply correlational assumptions about the nature of 
things.  Thus, in this compact semblance, when we wait, we do not really wait 
for something — for waiting, as suggested by Jones, is never satisfied by 
the arrival of presence. Waiting then rather than being an interminable 
duration of ‘what differs’ (Deleuze,  2004, 
p.
32), is a perpetual coincidence of events regardless of their presence. To wait
in the cycle of the throbber’s indexical image is simply to be present in an event 
of self-realisation that refutes the ontological dualism of digital or analogue. 
The image is always loading, it never arrives and the screen is not displayed.
15 Massumi’s semblance is paradoxical- ‘never actual but always in some way in-act’ (Massumi, 2011, p.19). 
16 According to Deleuze, Bergson’s intuition is “a method for eliminating false problems”  and the root of 
Bergson’s dualisms  (Deleuze 2004, p.20-23).
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